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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
-v-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; HAL S. BENNETT; FRANK WAR-
NER and EUGENE S. LAMBERT, Commis-
sioners of the Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
ERNEST H. DEAN, on behalf of himself as 
an individual and other citizens in number 
more than 25. 
Counter-Petitioners. 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T S 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This is a petition seeking review of a Report and 
Order entered by the Public Service Commission of 
Utah on May 15,1973, requiring petitioner, The Moun-
tain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, to 
provide extended area telephone service within certain 
areas of Utah County. 
I Case No. 
I 13412 
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D I S P O S I T I O N B Y 
P U B L I C S E R V I C E COMMISSION 
O F U T A H 
This matter was heard b ythe Public Service Com-
mission of Utah pursuant to a petition filed by petitioner 
seeking approval to provide Metropolitan Preferred 
area Calling ( M E T R O P A C ) . M E T R O P A C would 
be available as an optional service permitting a sub-
scriber to call other customers located within exchanges 
having their rate center within an eighteen-mile radius 
of the rate center in which the subscriber resides. A 
counter-petition was filed by Ernest H . Dean on behalf 
of himself and other citizens of Utah seeking toll-free, 
county-wide Extended Area Service (EAS) within 
Utah County. The Commission, in its Report and Order, 
ordered petitioner to install the facilities necessary to 
offer E A S in three areas of Utah County, as follows: 
(a) Between the exchanges of Lehi, Ameri-
can Fork, Pleasant Grove and Provo; 
(b) Between the exchanges of Provo, Span-
ish Fork and Payson; 
(c) Between the exchanges of Goshen, Pay-
son and Spanish Fork. 
The Order further provided that the customers in 
all of the various exchanges in Utah County, other than 
Springville and Goshen, would fall into a rate group 
"7" for purposes of determining their basic telephone 
rates. 
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondent submits that the Report and Order of 
the Public Service Commission should be affirmed. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The statement of facts, contained in the brief of 
the petitioner is substantially accurate. However, one 
addition should be made, and that is that the commission 
staff used an expert witness, as was stated in the state-
ment of facts by Mountain Bell, and said expert witness 
testified that, whereas Mountain Bell's witnesses indi-
cated a cost for extended area service of $4,700,000 or 
an increase in monthly rates of $3.00 per month for 
each customer, the staff witness testified that the in-
crease in cost would be only $1,212,000 and would re-
quire an increase in rates of only approximately $ .35 
per subscriber per month. 
P O I N T I 
T H E F I N D I N G S O F F A C T M A D E BY 
T H E C O M M I S S I O N A R E A D E -
Q U A T E L Y S U P P O R T E D BY T H E 
E V I D E N C E . 
A. The Commission found on the basis of the 
testimony of numerous public witnesses and thousands 
of letters and petition-signatures that the majority of 
Mountain Bell customers favored E A S over MERO-
PAC. Significantly, many of the letters and testimonies 
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were presented, not by individuals in their own behalf, 
but as representatives of local government entities, 
civic groups, chambers of commerce, and various other 
concerned organizations. The record shows support for 
E A S by testimony, letter, and petition of a wide cross-
section of the social, economic and geographical sectors 
of Utah County. While the Commission had to properly 
weigh such different forms of evidence in relation to 
its probative value, it could have come to no other con-
clusion than the one it stated in Paragraph 5 of the 
findings, even discounting the probative value of peti-
tions and letters as evidence. 
While it is true some witnesses showed that they 
did not fully understand the nature and effect of 
M E T R O P A C , most of the witnesses did demonstrate 
sufficient understanding of the differences between 
E A S and M E T R O P A C , so as to be able to express 
an intelligent preference. The Commission could not 
expect a public witness to have a total understanding 
of such a complex concept, especially in light of the fact 
that exact cost differentials were unavalable. The Com-
mission properly concluded that a majority of Moun-
tain Bell customers in Utah County would prefer 
county-wide, toll-free calling, even at a higher base 
rate. 
Petitioner's contention that the Commission's find-
ing is inconsistent with the evidence presented by Mt. 
Bell of a usage study ostensibly showing a lack of in-
terest in Utah County callers to make long-distance 
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calls to other customers within the county. The efficacy 
of such a test was depreciated, however, by repeated 
testimony of the need and desire to call long distance, 
but the hesitancy to do so because of the prohibitive 
cost involved (Tr. 65, 145) and the psychological bar-
rier to calling under toll circumstances (Tr. 137). Two 
witnesses went so far as to suggest this psychological 
factor had motivated them to drive some distance to 
communicate in order to avoid toll calling. I t is also 
interesting to note that not one public witness appeared 
to protest the proposed E AS service. 
The usage study of mountain bell was further con-
tradicted by evidence presented by numerous public 
witnesses and Mountain Bell, the expert witness testi-
fying on behalf of the ommission's staff, of distinct 
communities of interest between nonadjacent exchanges 
in Utah County. 
The strong community of interest which existed 
between the various towns in Utah County was empha-
sized by Mr. Wesley Bull, a witness called by the staff 
of the Public Service Commission, wherein he stated: 
As I previously stated, as shown by the 
exhibit (71), with the exception of Goshen, 
all exchanges have a community of interest 
with Provo/Orem. The exchanges located 
generally north of Provo do not indicate a 
community of interest with those exchanges 
located to the south. The same relationship 
holds true between the exchanges located south 
of Provo with the exchanges located generally 
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north of Provo. Goshen indicates a community 
of interest with Payson/Santaquin and pos-
sibly with Spanish Fork. (Tr. 572) 
Again, on Page 573 of the transcript, Mr. Bull 
stated: 
This study information indicated that all 
Utah County exchanges with the exception of 
Goshen are candidates for E A S to the Provo/ 
Orem exchanges. Goshen exchange showed a 
considerable community of interest with the 
neighboring exchanges of Payson/Santaquin 
and Spanish Fork. Little community of in-
terest was exhibited between the exchanges 
located generally north of Provo/Orem with 
those exchanges located to the south. The same 
situation prevailed between those exchanges 
located to the south with respect to the ex-
changes located generally north of Provo/Orem. 
In fact, Mountain Bell's own exhibits, Exhibits 31 
through 39, show that there is a large amount of calling 
between the various communities within Utah County, 
and Mountain Bell's own testimony is that the institu-
tion of extended area service would substantially 
increase the number of calls made between areas, and 
their testimony was that it would increase 15 times. 
The testimony of expert witness Wesley Bull 
clearly indicated that it was not necessary for everybody 
to be calling back and forth before extended area service 
was needed. In fact, in his testimony on pages 572 and 
573, he indicated that when the average number of mes-
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sages per main station originating in the smaller ex-
changes and terminating in the larger exchanges appro-
aches a figure of 3, that the area was a strong candidate 
for extended area service. Exhibit 71 clearly shows that 
there are a large number of areas which approach that 
figure, and these coincide with the information presented 
by Mountain Bell in Exhibits 31 to 39. 
The final blow to Mountain Bell's reliance on 
its usage study was self-inflicted. In subsequent testi-
mony by Mr. Kelly and Mr. Stevens (both of Mountain 
Bell), a stimulation factor of 15 was introduced into 
evidence as a partial justification for its forecast of 
$4,749,300 additional plant investment. I t would seem 
somewhat incosistent to argue at one point that there 
is no interest in Utah County for intra-county long-
distant calling and, at a later point, argue that the 
amount of such calling would increase 1,500 percent 
with E A S . 
B. In paragraph 6 of its findings, the Commission 
stated: 
"The various elements within Utah 
County are cooperatively working together 
for the achievement of various goals including 
industrial development within the county and 
the development of schools of regional and 
even national prominence. Utah County is an 
integrated single socio-economic unit. The 
present boundaries between exchanges in Utah 
County do not follow any meaningful bound-
aries between the communities within the 
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county and such boundaries retard orderly 
development and growth of the county and in-
hibit trade . . . ." 
This finding was based on repeated testimony by public 
witnesses expressing frustration at the artificial atmos-
phere created by toll charges between exchanges that 
were closely related socially, economically, religiously, 
and governmentally. Much of this testimony reflected 
the opinion that intra-county toll charges prevented the 
natural development of the county into a closer socio-
economic unit and placed it at a disadvantage with simi-
lar geographic areas that had extensive E A S . Attorney 
Ronald Stranger stated : 
" I think that I look at a Utah County 
as a unit " (Tr. 255) 
"I am a strong advocate of the fact that 
Utah County is a county that should pull to-
gether, and artificail boundaries are a thing of 
the past." (Tr. 256) 
President of the Provo Chamber of Commerce, Gordon 
Bullock, stated: 
". . . we feel that geographically that Utah 
County is definitely growing together, and 
that communications between each community 
is imperative." 
"In the past . . . we see functions which 
are geared specifically to cities, but now many 
of those functions are geared towards county 
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orientation and with this in mind we feel that 
the telephone system is critical to proper com-
munication between all agencies . . . ." (Tr. 
265) 
Ernest Dean, State Senator, stated: 
"The county has created what is known as 
an industrial development commission called 
U N I D A, and the whole purpose of that organ-
ization is to get Utah County working together 
to business and industrial development." 
Howard Kelly, Mayor of Payson, stated: 
"Here for many years we have been little 
pockets of communities. We have probably 
identified as Payson, Spanish Fork, Spring-
ville—and we had rivalry between townships 
and competition, and so forth of this sort, 
but this thing is fading fast. Our communities 
are tying faster together." (Tr. 134) 
These examples of testimony before the Commission 
demonstrates the general belief that Utah County is 
a socio-economic unit, and that the continued develop-
ment in this direction can be realized only without the 
artificial barriers of a toll system that discourages and 
inhibits communication between the various exchanges. 
The findings of the Commission were adequately sup-
ported by the record. 
The Commission's finding that "large families in 
Utah County have now scattered throughout the county 
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into the smaller communities'1 is supported throughout 
the record. Tr. 65, 71, 83, 90, 130, 132, 165, 177, 179, 
183,202,206,232.) 
The problem of outlying communities of communi-
cating with governmental entities and other offices and 
organizations in the Provo/Orem area is also reflected 
in the record. (Tr. 152, 162). 
C. While the record may indicate that the flow 
of telephone traffic was principally in one direction, into 
the Provo/Orem area, the Commission relied on evidence 
of a substantial community of interest between Provo 
and the outlying areas. Indeed, Mr. Bull recommended, 
based on his studies summarized in Exhibit No. 71, 
that Provo would be a proper candidate for E A S to 
the outlying areas. 
The Commission's findings that Utah County is a 
socio-economic unit with close family, religious, and 
economic ties support the Commission's conclusion that 
E A S would be of general benefit to all sectors of the 
county and facilitates its natural growth and integration. 
The fact that Mt. Bell's usage studies and Mr. Bull's 
studies show that more calls come into Provo than go 
out does not preclude a conclusion that E A S would be of 
value to all Utah County callers but only suggest that 
callers from outlying areas may benefit more than Provo 
callers. All will profit from E A S , but in different de-
grees. 
In paragraph 9 of its findings, the Commission 
stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"I t would appear that if something less 
than county-wide toll-free calling were ordered 
by the Commission, and based upon the testi-
mony of the staff's expert witness, that Mt. 
Bell may well be able to institute some sub-
stantially improved E A S offering in Utah 
County for an investment substantially less 
than their forecast of $4,749,300." 
This finding does not accept Mr. Bull's cost estimate 
of $1,212,000 but merely discounts the higher figure 
of Mountain Bell. Cross-examination of Mr. Kelly and 
other testimony revealed certain weaknesses in Mountain 
Bell's assumptions. In fact, Mr. Bull testified that 
Mountain Bell's forecast of $4,749,300 included certain 
facilities which Mountain Bell would construct, whether 
they installed the extended area service or not. Thus, 
one of the primary differentials in theories used by 
Mountain Bell as compared with Mr. Wesley Bull was 
that Mountain Bell's study assumed the construction 
of entirely new facilities for extended area service, 
whereas Mr. Wesley Bull's study would have utilized 
a portion of the reserve facilities and the current con-
struction already planed by Mountain Bell (Tr. 620-
621). Mr. Bull also testified that the monies which had 
already been programmed for Touch tone could be spent 
for extended area service senderization, which would also 
provide that Touch tone service and eliminate that 
duplication (Tr. 578 and 579). 
Questions regarding the projected stimulation 
factor of 15; the different approaches taken by Moun-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tain Bell regarding current reserves, excluding them in 
calculating E A S costs but including them in calculating 
M E T R O P A C costs; and other challenged Mountain 
Bell assumptions regarding construction costs and esti-
mates of the types of equipment needed for E A S , gene-
rated sufficient doubt as to the $4,749,300 figure to 
justify the Commission's finding that a more realistic 
figure would be substantially less. 
E. The Commission was justified in finding that 
Mountain Bell did not present evidence that it had 
studied the cost ramifications of providing M E T R O -
PAC. Most of Mr. Kelly's testimony focused upon 
E A S costs; little testimony was introduced regarding 
M E T R O P A C . Although the figure of $644,000 was 
suggested, the same detailed account of specific costs 
that was offered regarding E A S was unoffered. Of 
even greater concern to the Commission is the fact that 
Mountain Bell approached its projection for E A S and 
M E T R O P A C differently, preventing any meaningful 
comparison by the Commission. I t has already been 
mentioned that reserves were taken into account in the 
M E T R O P A C estimate but disregarded in the E A S 
projection. 
F A N D G. The Commission's finding in para-
graph 12 that the base exchange rates of the various 
exchanges would increase in relation to the additional 
terminals E A S would make available toll-free to each 
exchange's customers revealed that the outlying areas 
absorb the greater price rises. The Provo customer, who 
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ostensibly will least benefit from EAS, will suffer the 
smallest price rise. While it is clear that some Mountain 
Bell customers will be paying for a service they do not 
desire and thereby partially subsidizing those who do, 
the Commission was justified in recognizing that most 
substantially benefit of E A S falls on Utah County as 
a whole and augments its economic and social integration 
and development. 
The Commission has examined all the available 
evidence and found that E A S is in the public interest 
of Mountain Bell's Utah County customers. Despite 
the fact that some of these customers will profit more 
from this service than others, although all must contri-
bute in varying amounts, there is sufficient evidence 
in the record to support the Commission's finding that 
E A S is a service preferable over M E T R O P A C for 
Utah County. 
H . In paragraph 9 of its findings, the Commission 
states: 
"We do note, however, that if the invest-
ment required by Mt. Bell in carrying out the 
order set forth below were to be the full amount 
it anticipates $4,749,300, that its rate of return 
based upon its financial statements for the 
year 1972 filed with the Commission takes ad-
ministrative notice, would still be in excess of 
the rate of return allowed to Mt. Bell in the last 
general rate case for that company before this 
Commission." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
As petitioner states, this hearing did not involve 
a general rate case, nor a re-examination of Mt. Bell's 
proper rate of return. Should Mt. Bell find the extension 
of E A S in Utah County or other circumstantial changes 
reduced its rate of return, these matters can at some 
subsequent time be brought before the Commission. 
In summary, it is respectfully submitted that there 
was more than sufficient evidence from which the Com-
mission could and did make all of its findings, and the 
decision of the commission should be affirmed. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E C O M M I S S I O N W A S N O T 
B O U N D U N D E R T H E D O C T R I N E O F 
STARE DECISIS TO F O L L O W D I S -
CUSSION O F A N E A R L I E R R E P O R T 
A N D O R D E R O F T H E COMMISSION 
A N D W A S N O T A R B I T R A R Y A N D 
C A P R I C I O U S I N NOT D O I N G SO. 
On December 28, 1971, the Public Service Com-
mission issued a Report and Order pursuant to hearings 
held with regard to proposed telephone services to be 
provided in North Davis County. In a part of that Re-
port and Order entitled "Discussion", the Commission 
stated, as follows: 
\t» .ai* >k. &. su. iit ii» Alt ilt At" 
7[7 7ft TT> «T» <T» <T» <T> V *!» »l* 
, "8. I t is obvious from the testimony and 
study in this matter that the solution 
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to the situation which exists in North 
Davis County and other suburban areas 
of the state is not to simply continue to 
provide Extended Area Service outward 
from the metropolitan exchanges. Serious 
consideration must henceforth be given to 
the concept of usage-sensitive service in 
which the subscriber, within certain limi-
tations, is charged for telephone service 
on the basis of the frequency, length and 
distance of the calls which he makes. 
"9. In considering future cases, this Commis-
sion will give serious consideration to the 
concept that E A S should, generally, be 
provided only between contiguous ex-
changes and that calling to more distant 
exchanges should be provided by some 
form of usage-sensitive service." (Em-
phasis added). 
I t is doubtful that the authors of these statements 
intended them to be more than rather broad generaliza-
tions of a policy the commissioners would "seriously 
consider" in future cases, because such an approach 
seemed dictated by the facts and circumstances presented 
before the Commission at that time. I t is especially 
unlikely that the members of that Commission intended 
to commit themselves and subsequent members to a 
statewide policy regarding telephone services at the 
conclusion of a hearing that had a limited, regional scope 
and prevent the Commission at future hearings regard-
ing other regions from concluding and ordering on the 
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basis of new evidence and testimony that an entirely 
different approach must be taken in the specific area in 
question. Nor can we believe that the members of the 
Commission at that time intended their suggested policy 
to forever govern, even after petitioners of opposing 
views at subsequent hearings presented persuading evi-
dence that the earlier policy of the Commission would 
not be applicable forever for all localities. 
The Court's attention should be drawn to precise 
language in the Commission's paragraph 8. The force 
of the suggested policy stated therein is carefully quali-
fied by the adverb "generally". Such a qualification 
does not suggest an administrative intent to commit 
the Commission to an inflexible policy. 
The Court should also note the change in member-
ship of the Commission. The Report and Order of 
December 28, 1971, was issued by Commissioners Hack-
ing (Chairman), Bennett, and Vernieu. The Report and 
Order of May 15, 1973, the object of the instant appeal, 
was issued by Commissioners Warner (Chairman), 
Bennett, and Lambert. While such a change in person-
nel would be less significant with regard to the tradi-
tional concept of judicial stare decisis, it is especially 
relevant in administrative determinations where the 
expertise of the individual administrators with regard to 
technical fact finding and concern for policy at different 
times, in different areas of the state, is fundamental to 
the process. 
Petitioner cites little precedent for the applicability 
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of stare decisis in administrative law, although reference 
is made to 2 Davis, Administrative Law, Section 1707 
(sic) (1958). Even the most cursory reading of Section 
17.07 of that treatise reveals the limited nature of stare 
decisis in administrative adjudication. Although some 
agencies have employed the policy of developing prece-
dent upon which they normally rely, such a system is 
invariably self-imposed and lends itself only to certain 
administrative functions that closely approximate judi-
cial as opposed to fact-finding processes. 
The sole instances where stare decisis has been 
evoked by the courts in their review of administrative 
determinations is where the appellant has clearly shown 
detrimental reliance of a number of repeated, consistent 
administrative approaches to identical situations. Peti-
tioner has alluded to, but has not demonstrated or specie 
fied, any such reliance in the record. There is no reason 
in this instance why the Court would evoke the principle 
of equitable estoppel and overturn the findings of the 
Commission that are supported by the facts and ground-
ed upon public policy. 
Indeed, Section 17.07 cites considerable precedent 
contrary to the position of the petitioner. In F.C.C. v. 
Woko, Inc., 67 S.Ct. 213 (1946), the Federal Trade 
Commission denied renewal of a broadcasting exercise 
because of misrepresentations made by the license con-
cerning ownership of its capital stock. Before the review-
ing courts, one of the principal arguments was that 
comparable deceptions by other licensees had not been 
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dealt with so severly. A unanimous Supreme Court 
easily rejected this argument: 
"The mild measures to others and the 
apparently unannounced change of policy are 
considerations appropriate for the Commis-
sion in determining whether its action in this 
case is too drastic, but we cannot say that the 
Commission is bound by anything that appears 
before us to deal with all cases at all times as 
it has dealt with some that seem comparable." 
In rejecting a similar argument that the S.E.C., 
without warning, had changed its policy so as to treat 
the complaintant differently from others in similar cir-
cumstances the First Circuit said: 
"Flexibility was not the least of the ob-
jectives sought by Congress in selecting ad-
ministrative rather than judicial determination 
of the problems of security regulations . . . 
the administrator is expected to treat experi-
ence not as a pailer but as a teacher . . . ." 
Shawmut Ass'n. v. S.E.C., 146 F.2d 791 (1st 
Cir. 1945) 
I t is clearly stated in 73 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
482 Public Administrative Bodies and Procedures, Sec-
tion 148, i(Stare Decisis", that "administrative bodies 
ordinarily are not bound by their prior determinations, 
or the principles or policies therein, either under the 
doctrine of stare decisis or on the grounds of equitable 
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estoppel." This restatement of the law is based on numer-
ous case precedents. 
In Kentucky Broadcasting Corp. v. F.C.C., 174 
F.2d 38, (D.C. Cir. 1949), the Court held, as follows: 
"A preliminary answer to Kentucky's 
claim that the Commission erred in not follow-
ing its Valdosta decision is the rule of law that 
the doctrine of stare decisis is not generally 
applicable to the decisions of administrative 
tribunals . . . ." 
Similarly, in State Airlines v. C.A.B., 174 F.2d 510 
(D.C. Cir. 1949), it was stated: 
"I t is generally true that the administra-
tive agencies are free from the application of 
the judicial doctrines of stare decisis and res 
judicata as those doctrines may be advanced 
as to prior administrative determinations. 
Stated more simply, an administrative agency 
is not bound by its own prior determinations, 
though the courts may take those prior determi-
nations into consideration." 
And, finally, in iVX.JB.J9. v. Baltimore T. Co., 140 F.2d 
51 (4th Cir. 1944): 
"An administrative agency, charged with 
the protection of the public interest, is cer-
tainly not precluded from taking appropriate 
action to that end because of mistaken action 
on its part in the past." 
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Even if stare decisis were applicable to administra-
tive agencies, it is clear that a single, rather informal, 
decision of the Commission would not have the same 
compelling force of an authoritive precedent which would 
attach to a series of decisions in which the same principle 
was asserted. Nor need it be reminded that dicta, an 
opinion not necessary to the decision of a court, as was 
here the case, lacks the same force as a precise adjudica-
tion on an issue involved in the case. 
I t is respectfully submitted that the Commission, 
rather than acting capriciously and arbitrarily, respon-
sibly refused to be bound by an earlier discussion made 
without knowledge of all of the facts and testimony and, 
after a careful weighing of the evidence presented at the 
hearing, issued an Order directed at the issues currently 
before it, thereby fulfilling the legislative mandate con-
ferred upon it. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E COMMISSION'S O R D E R W A S 
NOT U N L A W F U L A N D U N R E A S O N -
A B L E I N NOT F O L L O W I N G R E -
C E N T D E C I S I O N S BY O T H E R REG-
U L A T O R Y A U T H O R I T I E S , N O R 
W A S T H E COMMISSION'S O R D E R 
U N F A I R A N D U N L A W F U L I N F A I L -
I N G TO F I N D T H A T P E T I T I O N E R ' S 
P R O P O S A L W A S R E A S O N A B L E . 
I t is not surprising that the Commission's Order 
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of May 15, 1973, was uninfluenced by "recent decisions 
by other regulatory authorities" insofar as the New 
York (May 30, 1973) and Arizona (Nov. 2, 1973) 
decisions referred to by petitioner had not been made 
until after the Commission's Order had been issued. 
The third reference (also to a New York Public Ser-
vice Commission decision) was issued in February of 
1973, over two months after the final day of hearings. 
The chronology of it all seriously vitiates petitioner's 
contention that the Commission unlawfully ''disre-
garded" these decisions. Even if this information had 
been part of the record, the Commission would have been 
under no obligation to make similar conclusions. No-
where will petitioner find precedent to support this 
curious extension of administrative stare decisis. 
Petitioner further argues that the Commission un-
lawfully failed to make findings as to the reasonabliness 
of M E T R O P A C in Utah County. Certainly, the Com-
mission would have been obligated to make such find-
ings under the usual circumstance where only one pro-
posal is before the Commission for its deliberation. Here, 
however, the Commission had before it two exclusive 
proposals. By determining, as it did, that E A S was in 
the public's best interest, the Commission indirectly 
found M E T R O P A C the less reasonable and less de-
sirable alternative. The Commission's findings "that 
the majority of Mountain Bell customers in Utah 
County desires county-wide, toll-free calling and is 
willing to pay a rate for such service which would be 
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equivalent to similar service enjoyed by subscribers in 
other localities" (Paragraph 6) ; that the vast majority 
of the hearing's witnesses testified they preferred E A S 
over M E T R O P A C (Paragraph 5 ) ; that E A S was 
financially feasible (Paragraph 9), and of great value to 
the social, economic, and governmental development of 
Utah County (Paragraph 6), support the Commission's 
conclusion that E A S should be adopted on a larger 
scale in Utah County. Such findings are phrased so as 
to positively reflect the Commission's preference for 
E A S based on its evaluation of the evidence and testi-
mony presented at the hearings. There is no reason why 
the Commission should restate or rephrase these same 
findings, so as to negatively respond to the METRO-
PAC proposal. 
I t should also be noted that the hearings evaluated 
to a large extent into a debate on the E A S proposal 
with little evidence or testimony being presented for or 
against M E T R O P A C . This is especially true with 
regard to the question of cost, as the Commission states 
in its findings in Paragraph 10 on Page 70 of the record: 
"For reasons unknown to and beyond the 
comprehension of this Commission, Mt. Bell 
did not offer evidence that it had studied the 
cost ramifications of providing M E T R O P A C 
service with anywhere near the depth that they 
studied the E A S proposal. Their testimony 
was that they could establish M E T R O P A C 
service in Utah County for a total additional 
plant investment of $664,000. However, the 
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in this c;isc thai Hut rigure is comparable in 
terms of the factors upon which it is based to 
the figures developed by Mt. Bell for the cost 
of instituting county-wide, toll-free serivece 
wi thin I '!:»]i ('uiinty. The Commission can, 
therefore, find little ui the evidence on which 
it can determine tiie relative costs of the E A S 
proposal to the M E T R O P A C proposal." 
I t is only natural, therefore, that the COIIII.IJJ.SSIC >n would 
make positive findings as to the reasonableness of E A S 
as opposed to negative findings as to the lesser reason-
ableness of M E T R O P A C . 
I I >\< 'II ,1 ' S M I J \l 
in conclusion, at page 585 of the transcript, AI: . 
Wesley Bull testified that if 27% of the subscribers in 
Utah County were to subscribe to M E T R O P A C , the 
telephone company revenues would equal the costs to 
provide that service, -in*. Msa; KAS service could be 
provided for very little m-'-n -f.-i.i 'hn- \-e^ J • !»• the 
calling habits winch ihm existed m l*t,-i!. County, he 
pi "Ejected that there would be a subscription to M E T -
R O P A C far in excess of 27%. H e also testified on that 
page of the transcript that "if the Provo/Utah County 
area grows there will be a greater desire b\ |h< j-ublie to 
have E A S throughout the area, t< »:\ HJ.U furnish 
telephone service <>n a K. .*».**•! ' .I^IS %w\\ undoubtedly re-
sult in siibscriber frustratioi. .»:... 1'ubii Service I Din-
mission complaints. I t »vuciid ^u ,^ Liiul u ^ fundamental 
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question to be asked is not, 'Is Utah County going to 
have EAS ' , but rather when, 'Will Utah County want 
and be willing to pay for E A S ?'" 
Also, on page 567 of the transcript, Mr. Bull testi-
fied that the Utah County population was estimated to 
more than double by the year 1990, and that ultimately 
it was his professional opinion that E A S would be re-
quired throughout the Provo/Utah County area. 
Based upon this testimony, it is clear that the Public 
Service Commission was virtually compelled to make 
the findings and conclusions which it made, and the 
decision of the Commission should be affirmed so that 
Mountain Bell may proceed immediately to provide the 
service which the residents of Utah County need and 
deserve. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
G. BLAINE DAVIS 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
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